Abstract-In this paper we analyze the effect of intrusion detection and response on the reliability of a cyber physical system (CPS) comprising sensors, actuators, control units, and physical objects for controlling and protecting a physical infrastructure. We develop a probability model based on stochastic Petri nets to describe the behavior of the CPS in the presence of both malicious nodes exhibiting a range of attacker behaviors, and an intrusion detection and response system (IDRS) for detecting and responding to malicious events at runtime. Our results indicate that adjusting detection and response strength in response to attacker strength and behavior detected can significantly improve the reliability of the CPS. We report numerical data for a CPS subject to persistent, random and insidious attacks with physical interpretations given. Per-node host IDS false negative probability Per-node host IDS false negative probability under persistent attacks Per-node host IDS false negative probability under random attacks
Per-node host IDS false positive probability under random attacks Per-node host IDS false positive probability under insidious attacks System IDS false negative probability System IDS false positive probability Random attack probability by a random attacker Attack probability Per-node capture rate Impairment rate for an attacker to cause severe functional impairment I. INTRODUCTION A cyber physical system (CPS) typically comprises sensors, actuators, control units, and physical objects for controlling and protecting a physical infrastructure. Because of the dire consequence of a CPS failure, protecting a CPS from malicious attacks is of paramount importance. In this paper, we address the reliability issue of a CPS designed to sustain malicious attacks over a prolonged mission period without energy replenishment. A CPS often operates in a rough environment wherein energy replenishment is not possible, and nodes may be compromised (or captured) at times. Thus, an intrusion detection and response system (IDRS) must detect malicious nodes without unnecessarily wasting energy to prolong the system lifetime.
Intrusion detection system (IDS) design for CPSs has attracted considerable attention [1] , [7] . Detection techniques in general can be classified into three types: signature based, anomaly based, and specification based techniques. In the area of signature based IDS techniques, Oman and Phillips [22] study an IDS for CPSs that transforms data collected in extensible markup language (XML) format to Snort signatures in an electricity distribution laboratory. Verba and Milvich [26] study an IDS for CPSs that takes a multitrust hybrid approach using signature based detection and traffic analysis. Our work is different from these studies in that we use specification based detection rather than signature based detection to deal with unknown attacker patterns.
In the area of anomaly based IDS techniques, Barbosa and Pras [2] study an IDS for CPSs that tests state machine and Markov chain approaches to traffic analysis on a water distribution system based on a comprehensive vulnerability assessment. Linda et al. [18] study an IDS for CPSs that uses error-back propagation and Levenberg-Marquardt approaches with window based feature extraction. Gao et al. [16] study an IDS for CPSs that uses a three stage back propagation artificial neural network (ANN) based on Modbus features. Bellettini and Rrushi [4] study an IDS for CPSs that seeds the runtime stack with NULL calls, applies shuffle operations, and performs detection using product machines. Yang et al. [28] study an IDS for CPSs that uses the simple network management protocol (SNMP) to drive prediction, residual calculation, and detection modules for an experimental testbed. Bigham et al. [5] study an IDS for CPSs that demonstrates promising control of detection and false negative rates. Tsang and Kwong [25] study a rich multitrust IDS for CPSs that uses a novel machine learning approach. Xie et al. [27] survey anomaly detection techniques, and advocate an anomaly based layered approach. Our work is different from these studies in that we use specification based rather than anomaly based techniques to avoid using resource-constrained sensors or actuators in a CPS for profiling anomaly patterns (e.g., through learning), and to avoid high false positives (treating good nodes as bad nodes).
In the area of specification-based IDS techniques, Cheung et al. [12] study a specification based IDS that uses PVS to transform protocol, communication pattern, and service availability specifications into a format compatible with EMERALD. Carcano et al. [6] propose a specification based IDS that extends [15] ; it distinguishes faults from attacks, describes a language to express a CPS specification, and establishes a critical state distance metric. Zimmer et al. [29] study a specification based IDS that instruments a target application, and uses a scheduler to confirm timing analysis results. Our work is also specification based. However, our work is different from these prior studies in that we automatically map a specification into a state machine consisting of good and bad states, and simply measure a node's deviation from good states at runtime for intrusion detection. Moreover we apply specification-based techniques to host-level intrusion detection only. To cope with incomplete, uncertain information available to nodes in the CPS, and to mitigate the effect of node collusion, we devise system-level intrusion detection based on multitrust to yield a low false alarm probability.
While the literature is abundant in the collection and analysis aspects of intrusion detection, the response aspect is little treated. In particular, there is a gap with respect to intrusion detection and response. Our IDRS design addresses both intrusion detection and response issues, with the goal to maximize the CPS lifetime.
Our methodology for CPS reliability assessment is modelbased analysis. Specifically, we develop a probability model to assess the reliability property of a CPS equipped with an IDRS for detecting and responding to malicious events detected. Untreated in the literature, we consider a variety of attacker behaviors including persistent, random, and insidious attacker models, and identify the best design settings of the detection strength and response strength to best balance energy conservation versus intrusion tolerance for achieving high reliability, when given a set of parameter values characterizing the operational environment and network conditions. Parameterization of the model using the properties of the IDS system is one major contribution of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the system model. Section III develops a mathematical model based on stochastic Petri nets [10] , [11] , [23] for theoretical analysis. Section IV discusses the parameterization process for the reference CPS. Section V presents numerical data with physical interpretations given. Finally, Section VI outlines some future research areas.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Reference CPS
Our reference CPS model is based on the CPS infrastructure described in [21] comprising 128 sensor carrying mobile nodes. Each node uses its sensor to measure any detectable phenomena nearby, and ranges its neighbors periodically by transmitting a code division multiple access (CDMA) waveform. Neighbors receiving that waveform transform the timing of the code (1023 symbols) and carrier (915 MHz) into distance. Essentially, each node performs sensing and reporting functions to provide information to upper layer control devices to control and protect the CPS infrastructure, and in addition utilizes its ranging function for node localization and intrusion detection.
The reference model is a special case of a single-enclave system with homogeneous nodes. The IDS functionality is distributed to all nodes in the system for intrusion and fault tolerance. On top of the sensor carrying mobile nodes sits an enclave control node responsible for setting system parameters in response to dynamically changing conditions such as changes of attacker strength. The control module is assumed to be fault and intrusion free through security and hardware protection mechanisms against capture attacks and hardware failure. Fig. 1 contextualizes our reference CPS which comprises 128 sensor carrying mobile nodes, a control unit, and physical objects for controlling and protecting a physical infrastructure. The mobile nodes are capable of sensing physical environments, as well as actuating and controlling the underlying physical objects in the CPS. They function as sensors and actuators, each carrying sensors for sensing physical phenomena, as well as actuating devices for controlling physical objects. The CPS literature identifies these mobile nodes as remote terminal units (RTUs). Sitting on top of these mobile nodes is a control unit which receives sensing data from the mobile nodes and determines actions to be performed by individual nodes or a group of mobile nodes. The CPS literature identifies the control unit as the master terminal unit (MTU). The actions formulated by the MTU trigger actuating devices to control and protect the physical objects in the CPS. We exemplify a number of applications to which our reference CPS can apply. 1) Disaster recovery (say after an earthquake) might involve a group of mobile nodes with motion and video sensing and actuating capabilities cooperating under the control of a disaster corrective control unit to protect and recover physical objects (e.g., people or a physical infrastructure). 2) Emergency rescue (say a burning building) may require a group of mobile fighters equipped with motion and video sensing and fighting capabilities cooperating under the control of a control unit to rescue physical objects (e.g., people trapped or seized). 3) Military patrol (combat or reconnaissance) [13] might consist of a group of mobile patrol nodes equipped with motion sensing and fighting capabilities cooperating under the control of a control unit to protect and control physical objects (e.g., geographic areas or critical resources). 4) Pervasive healthcare [19] might use a group of mobile medical personnel equipped with motion and video sensing and actuating capabilities cooperating under the control of a control unit to protect and provide healthcare to physical objects (e.g., patients or medical devices). 5) Unmanned aircraft systems [20] might consist of a group of unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with sensing and aircraft fighting capabilities cooperating under the control of a remote control unit to control and protect physical objects (e.g., geographic areas). Our reference CPS is distinct from Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). WSNs are resource constrained, mostly stationary, and have a specific traffic profile. On the other hand, our reference CPS is safety-critical, mobile, and uses ad hoc networking with bidirectional flows. We do not make any assumptions regarding the network structure used to connect nodes in a CPS. In our reference CPS, nodes are mobile, and they are connected through wireless links to the control node. Our host IDS design (Section II-D) is based on local monitoring, and our system-level IDS design (Section II-E) is based on the voting of neighbor monitoring nodes. Both IDS techniques can be generically applied to any network structure (such as a star configuration) used in a CPS.
B. Security Failure
While our approach is general enough to take any security failure definition, we consider two security failure conditions. The first condition is based on the Byzantine fault model [17] . That is, if one-third or more of the nodes are compromised, then the system fails. The reason is that once the system contains 1/3 or more compromised nodes, it is impossible to reach a consensus, hence inducing a security failure. The second condition is impairment failure. That is, a compromised CPS node performing active attacks without being detected can impair the functionality of the system and cause the system to fail. Impairment failure is modeled by defining an impairment-failure attack period by a compromised node beyond which the system cannot sustain the damage.
Specifically, a control unit in our reference CPS would take in multiple sensor readings (from sensor carrying mobile nodes) sensing the same physical phenomena to make a decision on actions to be performed by a set of actuators (also mobile nodes). The first failure mode, Byzantine failure, accounts for the condition that the control unit is not able to obtain any sensor reading consensus. The second failure mode, impairment failure, accounts for the condition that impairment by a bad node (especially an actuator) over an impairment-failure period without being detected will severely impair the system and cause the system to fail.
C. Attack Model
The first step in investigating network security is to define the attack model. We consider capture attacks which turn a good node into a bad insider node. At the sensor-actuator layer of the CPS architecture, a bad node can perform data spoofing attacks (reporting spoof sensor data) and bad command execution attacks. At the networking layer, a bad node can perform various communication attacks including selective forwarding, packet dropping, packet spoofing, packet replaying, packet flooding, and even Sybil attacks to disrupt the system's packet routing functionality. At the control layer, a bad node can perform control-level attacks including aggregated data spoofing attacks, and command spoofing attacks. Nodes at the control layer, however, are less susceptible to capture attacks because they are normally deployed in a physical confine which protects them from tampering. For this reason, in this paper, our primary interest is on capture attacks of sensor-actuator nodes performing basic sensing, actuating, and networking functions.
We consider three attacker models: persistent, random, and insidious. A persistent attacker performs attacks with probability one (i.e., whenever it has a chance). The primary objective is to cause impairment failure. A random attacker performs attacks randomly with probability . The primary objective is to evade detection. It may take a longer time for a random attacker to cause impairment failure because the attack is random. However, random attackers are hidden so it may increase the probability of Byzantine security failure once the number of bad nodes equals or exceeds 1/3 of the node population. An insidious attacker is hidden all the time to evade detection until a critical mass of compromised nodes is reached to perform "all in" attacks. The primary objective is to maximize the failure probability caused by either impairment or Byzantine security failure.
D. Host Intrusion Detection
Our host intrusion detection protocol design is based on two core techniques: behavior rule specification, and vector similarity specification. The basic idea of behavior rule specification is to specify the behavior of an entity (a sensor or an actuator) by a set of rules from which a state machine is automatically derived. Then, node misbehavior can be assessed by observing the behaviors of the node against the state machine (or behavior rules). The basic idea of vector similarity specification is to compare similarity of a sequence of sensor readings, commands, or votes among entities performing the same set of functions. A state machine is also automatically derived from which a similarity test is performed to detect outliers. More specifically, the states derived in the state machine would be labeled as secure versus insecure. A monitoring node then applies snooping and overhearing techniques observing the percentage of time a neighbor node is in secure states over . A longer sojourn time in secure states indicates greater specification compliance, while a shorter sojourn time indicates less specification compliance. If falls below , node is considered compromised. We apply these two host IDS techniques to the reference CPS as follows. (a) A monitoring node periodically determines a sequence of locations of a sensor carrying mobile node within radio range through ranging, and detects if the location sequence (corresponding to the state sequence) deviates from the expected location sequence. (b) A monitoring node periodically collects votes from neighbor nodes who have participated in system intrusion detection (described below), and detects dissimilarity of vote sequences among these neighbors for outlier detection.
The measurement of compliance degree of a node frequently is not perfect, and can be affected by noise and unreliable wireless communication in the CPS. We model the compliance degree by a random variable with distribution [24] , with the value 0 indicating that the output is totally unacceptable (zero compliance), and 1 indicating the output is totally acceptable (perfect compliance), such that , , is given by (1) and the expected value of is given by (2) The and parameters are to be estimated based on the method of maximum likelihood by using the compliance degree history collected during the system's testing phase in which the system is tested with its anticipated attacker event profile, and where the compliance degree is assessed using the specification-based host IDS technique described earlier. A node's anticipated event profile describes a node's behaviors, and predicts the next state the node will be entering upon an event occurrence, given that the node is in its current state. For example, a persistent attacker will likely go to another bad state because it performs attacks continuously. A random attacker will likely go to a bad state in accordance to its random attack probability because it performs attacks randomly. A good node on the other hand will likely go to another good state because it complies with its behavior rules, unless the detection of its behaviors is hindered by noise or wireless channel error. The compliance degree history collected this way is the realization of a sequence of random variables , and is the total number of compliance degree outputs observed. The maximum likelihood estimates of and are obtained by numerically solving
where A less general though simpler model is to consider a single parameter distribution with equal to 1. In this case, the density is for , and 0 otherwise. The maximum likelihood estimate of is (4) Host intrusion detection is characterized by and . While many detection criteria [3] , [8] , [9] are possible, we consider a threshold criterion in this paper. That is, if is higher than , then there is a false negative. Suppose that is modeled by a distribution as described above. Then is given by (5) On the other hand, if is less than then there is a false positive. Again suppose that is modeled by a distribution. Then is given by
Here we observe that these two probabilities are largely affected by the setting of . A large induces a small false negative probability at the expense of a large false positive probability. Conversely, a small induces a small false positive probability at the expense of a large false negative probability. A proper setting of in response to attacker strength detected at runtime helps maximize the system lifetime.
E. System Intrusion Detection
Our system IDS technique is based on majority voting of host IDS results to cope with incomplete and uncertain information available to nodes in the CPS. Our system-level IDS technique involves the selection of detectors as well as the invocation interval to best balance energy conservation versus intrusion tolerance for achieving high reliability. Each node periodically exchanges its routing information, location, and identifier with its neighbor nodes. A coordinator is selected randomly among neighbors so that the adversaries will not have specific targets. We add randomness to the coordinator selection process by introducing a hashing function that takes in the identifier of a node concatenated with the current location of the node as the hash key. The node with the smallest returned hash value would then become the coordinator. Because candidate nodes know each other's identifier and location, they can, without trading information, execute the hash function to determine which node would be the coordinator. The coordinator then selects detectors randomly (including itself), and lets all detectors know each others' identities so that each voter can send its yes or no vote to other detectors. Vote authenticity is achieved via preloaded public keys. At the end of the voting process, all detectors will know the same result; the node is diagnosed as good, or as bad based on the majority vote.
The system IDS is characterized by and . These two false alarm probabilities are not constant but vary dynamically, depending on the percentage of bad nodes in the system when majority voting is performed. We will derive these two probabilities in the paper. 
F. Intrusion Response
Our IDRS reacts to malicious events detected at runtime by adjusting . For example, when it senses an increasing attacker strength, it can increase with the objective to prevent impairment security failure. This approach results in a smaller false negative probability, which has a positive effect of reducing the number of bad nodes in the system, and decreasing the probability of impairment security failure. However, it also results in a larger false positive probability, which has the negative effect of reducing the number of good nodes in the system, and consequently increasing the probability of Byzantine security failure. To compensate for the negative effect, the IDRS increases the audit rate (by decreasing the intrusion detection interval) or increases the number of detectors to reduce the false positive probability at the expense of more energy consumption. The relationship between the minimum compliance threshold set versus and must be determined at static time so the system can adjust dynamically in response to malicious events detected at runtime.
III. MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Our theoretical model utilizes stochastic Petri net (SPN) techniques [14] . Fig. 2 shows the SPN model describing the ecosystem of a CPS with intrusion detection and response under capture, impairment, and Byzantine security attacks.
The underlying model of the SPN model is a continuous-time semi-Markov process with a state representation where is a binary variable with 1 indicating impairment security failure, and is a binary variable with 1 indicating energy availability and 0 indicating energy exhaustion.
The input parameters to the SPN model are , , , , , , and . The derived parameters are , , ,
. The only output parameter is MTTF. Table I annotates transitions, and gives transition rates used in the SPN model. The SPN model shown in Fig. 2 is constructed as follows.
• We use tokens to represent nodes. We use places to hold tokens. Initially, all nodes are good nodes (e.g., 128 in our reference CPS). Hence initially place holds tokens.
• We use transitions to model events. Specifically, TCP models good nodes being compromised; TFP models a good node being falsely identified as compromised; TIDS models a bad node being detected correctly.
• Good nodes may become compromised because of capture attacks with rate . This assumption is modeled by associating transition TCP with an aggregate rate . Firing TCP will move tokens one at a time (if it exists) from place to place . Tokens in place represent bad nodes performing impairment attacks with probability .
• When a bad node is detected by the system IDS as compromised, the number of compromised nodes evicted will be incremented by 1, so place will hold one more token. On the other hand, the number of undetected compromised nodes will be decremented by 1, i.e., place will hold one less token. These detection events are modeled by associating transition TIDS with a rate of , with accounting for the system IDS true positive probability.
• The system-level IDS can incorrectly identify a good node as compromised. This is modeled by moving a good node in place to place from firing transition TFP with a rate of , with accounting for the system IDS false positive probability.
• The system energy is exhausted after time , where is the maximum number of intrusion detection intervals the CPS can possibly perform before it exhausts its energy due to performing ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection functions. It can be estimated by considering the amount of energy consumed in each interval. This energy exhaustion event is modeled by placing a token in place initially, and firing transition TEN-ERGY with rate . When the energy exhaustion event occurs, the token in place will be vanished, and the system enters an absorbing state meaning the lifetime is over. This condition is modeled by disabling all transitions in the SPN model.
• When the number of bad nodes (i.e., tokens in place ) is at least 1/3 of the total number of nodes (tokens in places and ), the system fails because of a Byzantine failure. The system lifetime is over, and is modeled again by disabling all transitions in the SPN model.
• Bad nodes in place perform attacks with probability , and cause impairment to the system. After an impairment-failure time period is elapsed, heavy impairment due to attacks will result in a security failure. We model this situation by firing transition TIF with a rate of indicating the amount of time needed by bad nodes to reach this level of impairment, beyond which the system cannot sustain the damage. The value of is system specific, and is determined by domain experts. A token is flown into place when such a security failure occurs. Once a token is in place , the system enters an absorbing state, meaning the lifetime is over. Again, it is modeled by disabling all transitions in the SPN model. Here we note that the last two bullet points cover the two conditions that would cause a security failure.
We utilize the SPN model to analyze two design tradeoffs.
• Detection strength versus energy consumption-As we increase the detection frequency (a smaller ) or the number of detectors (a larger ), the detection strength increases, thus preventing the system from running into a security failure. However, this increases the rate at which energy is consumed, thus resulting in a shorter lifetime. Consequently, there is an optimal setting of and under which the system MTTF is maximized, given the node capture rate and attack model.
• Detection response versus attacker strength-As the random attack probability decreases, the attacker strength decreases, thus lowering the probability of security failure due to impairment attacks. However, compromised nodes become more hidden and difficult to detect because they leave less evidence traceable, resulting in a higher per-host false negative probability , and consequently a higher system-level false negative probability . This increases the probability of security failure due to Byzantine attacks. The system can respond to a detected instantaneous attacker strength, and adjust to trade a high per-host false positive probability for a low per-host false negative probability , or vice versa, so as to minimize the probability of security failure. Hence, there exists an optimal setting of as a function of attacker strength detected at time under which the system security failure probability is minimized. Let be a binary random variable denoting the lifetime of the system such that it takes on the value of 1 if the system is alive at time , and 0 otherwise. Then, the expected value of is the reliability of the system at time . Consequently, the integration of from to gives the mean time to failure (MTTF) or the average lifetime of the system we aim to maximize. The binary value assignment to can be done by means of a reward function assigning a reward of 0 or 1 to state at time as if system is alive in state , if system fails due to security or energy failure.
A state is represented by the distribution of tokens to places in the SPN model. For example, with the SPN model defined in Fig. 2 , the underlying state is represented by . When place contains zero tokens, it indicates energy exhaustion. When is less than or equal to twice , it indicates a Byzantine failure. When place contains a token, it indicates a security failure due to significant functional impairment. Once the binary value of 0 or 1 is assigned to all states of the system as described above, the reliability of the system is the expected value of weighted on the probability that the system stays at a particular state at time , which we can obtain easily from solving the SPN model using stochastic Petri net [14] . The MTTF of the system is equal to the cumulative reward to absorption, i.e., (7) which we can again compute easily using SPNP.
IV. PARAMETERIZATION
We consider the reference CPS model introduced in Section II operating in a 2 2 area with a network size of 128 nodes initially. Hence, the number of neighbors within radio range initially is about . Our IDS design is based on local monitoring, so it can be generically applied to any network structure. A node in our reference CPS uses a 35 Wh battery, so its energy is 126000 J. The system energy initially is therefore . Table II lists the set of parameters and their values for the reference CPS.
A. System-Level IDS and
We first parameterize the system IDS and given perhost IDS false positive probability and per-host IDS false negative probability as input. We first note that and highly depend on the attacker behavior. A persistent attacker constantly performs slandering attacks such that it will vote a bad node as a good node, and conversely a good node as a bad node, to eventually cause a security failure. However, a random or an insidious attacker will only perform slandering attacks randomly with probability to avoid detection. We first differentiate the number of active bad nodes, , from the number of inactive bad nodes, , with , such that at any time (8) (9) The difference between an active bad node and an inactive bad node is that an inactive bad node behaves as if it were a good node to evade detection, including casting votes the same way as a good node would, when it participates in the system-level IDS voting process.
For a persistent attacker, . For a random attacker, . For an insidious attacker, to maximize the benefit of colluding attacks, a compromised node stays dormant until a critical mass of compromised nodes is gathered so that when , and otherwise, where is a parameter reflecting the insidiousness degree. In other words, all bad nodes engage in active attacks when there is a critical mass of compromised nodes in the system.
We calculate by (10) (See equation at bottom of page). The equation for is the same except replacing by in the right hand side expression.
We explain (10) for obtaining in detail below. The explanation for follows the same logic. In (10), this is the number of detectors, and is the majority of . The first summation aggregates the probability of a false negative stemming from selecting a majority of active bad nodes. That is, it is equal to the number of ways to choose a majority of nodes from the set of active bad nodes times the number of ways to choose a minority of nodes from the set of good nodes, and inactive bad nodes divided by the number of ways to choose nodes from the set of all good and bad nodes. The second summation aggregates the probability of a false negative stemming from selecting a minority of nodes from the set of active bad nodes which always cast incorrect votes, coupled with selecting a sufficient number of nodes from the set of good nodes and inactive bad nodes which make incorrect votes with probability , resulting in a majority of incorrect votes being cast.
B. Host IDS and
Next, we parameterize the host IDS false negative probability and false positive probability for persistent, random, and insidious attacks. For the case of persistent attacks with , the system, after a thorough testing and debugging phase, determines a minimum threshold such that and , measured respectively based on (5) and (6) , are acceptable to system design.
For the case of random attacks with probability , conceivably the amount of evidence observable from a bad node would be diminished proportional to . Consequently, with the same minimum threshold being used, the host false negative probability would increase. We again utilize (5), and (6) to respectively obtain , and for each given value during the testing and debugging phase. Here we note that the host false (10) positive probability would remain the same, i.e.
, because the attacker behavior does not affect false positives, given the same minimum threshold being used. Lastly, under insidious attacks, the false positive probability is not affected, so . Because insidious nodes stay dormant until a critical mass is achieved to perform "all in" attacks, the false negative probability is one during the dormant period, and is equal to that under persistent attacks during the "all in" attack period. Specifically, if , otherwise.
Here we note that and obtained above for persistent, random, or insidious attacks would be a function of time as input to (10) for calculating system-level IDS and dynamically.
We apply the statistical analysis described by (1)- (4) to get the maximum likelihood estimates of (with set as 1) under each attacker behavior model, and then utilize (5) and (6) to yield and . The system minimum threshold is set to to yield , and . Table III  summarizes values, and the resulting and values under various attacker behavior models. The persistent attack model is a special case in which . The insidious attack model is another special case in which during the "all in" attack period, and during the dormant period.
C. Parameterizing for Dynamic Intrusion Response
The parameterization of and above is based on a constant being used (i.e., ). A dynamic IDS response design is to adjust in response to the attacker strength detected with the goal to maximize the system lifetime. The attacker strength of a node, say node , may be estimated periodically by node 's intrusion detectors. That is, the compliance degree value of node , , as collected by intrusion detectors based on observations collected during , is compared against the minimum threshold set for persistent attacks. If , then node is considered a bad node performing active attacks at time ; otherwise, it is a good node. This information is passed to the control module who subsequently estimates , representing the attacker strength at time .
In this paper, we investigate a simple yet efficient IDS response design. The basic idea is to decrease the per-host false negative probability when the attacker strength is high, so we may quickly remove active attackers from the system to prevent impairment failure. This goal is achieved by increasing the value. Conversely, when there is little attacker evidence detected, we lower so we may quickly decrease the probability of a good node being misidentified as a bad node, i.e., lowering the per-host false positive probability, to prevent Byzantine failure.
While there are many possible ways to dynamically control , in this paper we consider a linear one-to-one mapping function as (12) Essentially we set to when detected at time is 1, and linearly increase (or decrease) with increasing (or decreasing) attacker strength detected. With in our CPS reference system, we set and parameterize as if if if if (13) Note that when is closer to 1, a node will more likely be considered as compromised even if it wanders only for a small amount of time in insecure states. A large induces a small per-host false negative probability at the expense of a large per-host false positive probability .
D. Energy
Lastly, we parameterize , the maximum number of intrusion detection cycles the system can possibly perform before energy exhaustion, as (14) where is the energy consumed per interval due to ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection functions, calculated as (15) where , , stand for energy spent for ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection in a interval, respectively. Here the energy spent per node is multiplied with the node population in the CPS to get the total energy spent by all nodes per cycle.
In (15), stands for the energy spent for periodic ranging. It is calculated as (16) Here a node spends energy to transmit a CDMA waveform. Its neighbors each spend energy to receive the waveform, and each spend energy to transform it into distance. This operation is repeated for times for determining a sequence of locations. In (15) , stands for the amount of energy consumed due to periodic sensing. It is computed as (17) Here a node spends energy for sensing navigation and multipath mitigation data, and energy for analyzing sensed data for each of its neighbors. Finally, stands for the energy used for performing intrusion detection on a target node. It can be calculated by (18) Here we consider the energy required to choose intrusion detectors to evaluate a target node (the first term), and the energy required for intrusion detectors to vote (the second term). Specifically, the first term is the number of intrusion detectors times the cost of transmitting plus the number of nodes in radio range times the cost of receiving. The second term is the number of intrusion detectors times the cost of transmitting plus the number of peer intrusion detectors times the cost of receiving plus the cost of analyzing the vote.
V. NUMERICAL DATA
In this section, we present numerical data for reliability assessment as a result of executing intrusion detection and response in a CPS. Our objective is to identify optimal design settings in terms of the optimal values of , , and under which we can best trade energy consumption versus intrusion detection, as well as response effectiveness versus impairment security failure, to maximize the system MTTF, when given a set of parameter values characterizing the operational and networking conditions.
A. Effect of Intrusion Detection Strength
We first examine the effect of intrusion detection strength measured by the intrusion interval,
, and the number of intrusion detectors, . We only present results for the reference CPS under persistent attacks, as the results for other types of attacks show similar trends. Fig. 3 shows MTTF versus as the number of detectors ( ) in the system-level IDS varies over the range of [3, 11] in increments of 2. We see that there exists an optimal value at which the system lifetime is maximized to best tradeoff energy consumption versus intrusion tolerance. Initially, when is too small, the system performs ranging, sensing, and intrusion detection too frequently, and quickly exhausts its energy, resulting in a small lifetime. As increases, the system saves more energy, and its lifetime increases. Finally, when is too large, although the system can save even more energy, it fails to catch bad nodes often enough, resulting in the system having many bad nodes. Bad nodes through active attacks can cause impairment security failure. Furthermore, when the system has 1/3 or more bad nodes out of the total population, a Byzantine failure ensues. We observe that the optimal value at which the system MTTF is maximized is sensitive to the value. The general trend is that, as increases, the optimal value decreases. Here we observe that is optimal to yield the maximum MTTF because too many intrusion detectors would induce energy exhaustion failure, while too few intrusion detectors would induce security failure. Using can best balance energy exhaustion failure versus security failure for high reliability. Fig. 4 shows MTTF versus as the compromising rate varies over the range of once per 4 hours to once per 24 hours to test the sensitivity of MTTF with respect to (with fixed at five to isolate its effect). We first observe that, as increases, MTTF decreases because a higher will cause more compromised nodes to be present in the system. We also observe that the optimal decreases as increases. This happens because, when more compromised nodes exist, the system needs to execute intrusion detection more frequently to maximize MTTF. Fig. 4 identifies the best to be used to maximize the lifetime of the reference CPS to balance energy exhaustion versus security failure, when given and characterizing the operational and networking conditions of the system.
B. Effect of Attacker Behavior
In this section, we analyze the effect of various attacker behavior models, including persistent (with , and given as input), random (with , , and given as input), and insidious attacks (with when and otherwise, , and defined by (11) given as input). The analysis conducted here is based on static . In the next section, we will analyze the effect of dynamic as a response to attacker strength detected at runtime. Fig. 5 shows MTTF versus with varying values. We first observe that the system MTTF is low when is small (e.g., ). This happens because, when is small, most bad nodes are dormant and remain in the system without being detected. Thus, the system suffers from Byzantine failure quickly, leading to a low MTTF. As increases from 0.025 to 0.2, the system MTTF increases because of a higher chance of bad nodes being detected and removed from the system, thus reducing the probability of Byzantine security failure. As increases further, however, the system MTTF decreases again because of a higher probability of impairment security failure as there will be more bad nodes actively performing impairment attacks. In the extreme case of , all bad nodes perform attacks, and the system failure is mainly caused by impairment. The maximum MTTF occurs when , at which point the probability of security failure due to either type of security attacks is minimized. Here we should note that the result of yielding the highest MTTF is a balance of impairment security failure rate versus Byzantine failure rate dictated by the parameter settings of the reference CPS as given in Tables II and III . Fig. 6 compares the MTTF versus of the reference CPS under the three attacker types head-to-head. It shows that the MTTF is the highest for the reference CPS under random attacks. The MTTF of the CPS under persistent attacks is the second highest. As expected, the reference CPS under insidious attacks has the lowest MTTF. We attribute this result to the fact that insidious attacks while dormant can cause Byzantine failure, and while "all in" can cause impairment failure. The extent to which the system MTTF differs depends on the relative rate at which impairment failure versus Byzantine failure occurs. The former is dictated by , and the latter is dictated by how fast the Byzantine failure condition is satisfied. The result that the MTTF difference between persistent attacks (the second curve) and insidious attacks (the last curve) is relatively significant is due to a large Byzantine failure rate compared with the impairment failure rate. On the other hand, the reference CPS under random attacks can more effectively prevent either Byzantine failure or impairment failure from occurring by removing bad nodes as soon as they perform attacks. The system MTTF difference between random versus persistent attacks again depends on the relative rate at which impairment failure versus Byzantine failure occurs.
C. Effect of Intrusion Response
In this section, we analyze the effect of intrusion response, i.e., dynamic as a response to attacker strength detected at runtime, on the system MTTF. Fig. 7 shows MTTF versus under the static design and the dynamic design for the persistent attack case. We see there is a significant gain in MTTF under dynamic over static . The reason is that, with persistent attacks, all bad nodes are actively performing attacks, so the system is better off by increasing to a high level to quickly remove bad nodes to prevent impairment failure. We observe that the optimal value under the dynamic design is smaller than that under the static design to quickly remove nodes that perform active attacks. Fig. 8 shows the MTTF versus under the static design and the dynamic design for the random attack case with . We pick the case of because it yields the highest MTTF among all random attack cases in the reference CPS system (see Fig. 5 ). Here again we observe that dynamic performs significantly better than static , when operating at the identified optimal value. The optimal value under dynamic again is smaller than that under static to quickly remove nodes that perform active attacks. Fig. 9 shows the MTTF versus under the static design and the dynamic design for the insidious attack case. Here we observe the MTTF difference is relatively small compared with persistent or random attacks. The reason is that bad nodes do not perform active attacks until a critical mass is reached, so dynamic would set a lower value during the dormant period while rapidly setting a higher value during the attack period. Because the attack period is relatively short compared with the dormant period, the gain in MTTF isn't very significant. Nevertheless, we observe, even for insidious attacks, dynamic still performs better than static . As our dynamic control function (12) adjusts solely based on the attacker strength detected regardless of the attacker type, we conclude that the dynamic design as a response to attacker strength detected at runtime can improve MTTF compared with the static design.
VI. FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed a probability model to analyze the reliability of a cyber physical system in the presence of both malicious nodes exhibiting a range of attacker behaviors, and an intrusion detection and response system for detecting and responding to malicious events at runtime. For each attacker behavior, we identified the best detection strength (in terms of the detection interval and the number of detectors), and the best response strength (in terms of the per-host minimum compliance threshold for setting the false positive and negative probabilities), under which the reliability of the system may be maximized.
There are several future research directions, including (a) investigating other intrusion detection criteria (e.g., based on accumulation of deviation from good states) other than the current binary criterion used in the paper based on a minimum compliance threshold to improve the false negative probability without compromising the false positive probability; (b) investigating other intrusion response criteria (e.g., exponential increase of the minimum compliance threshold) other than the linear function used in the paper, and analyzing the effect on the system lifetime; (c) exploring other attack behavior models (e.g., an oracle attacker that can adjust the attacker strength depending on the detection strength to maximize security failure), and investigating the best dynamic response design to cope with such attacks; (d) developing a more elaborate model to describe the relationship between intrusion responses and attacker behaviors, and justifying such a relationship model by means of extensive empirical studies; and (e) extending the analysis to hierarchically-structured intrusion detection and response system design for a large CPS consisting of multiple enclaves each comprising heterogeneous entities subject to different operational and environment conditions and attack threats.
